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EYING THE PROMISED LAND: THE WEARISOME
QUEST FOR AN EFFECTI VE REGIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS ENFORCEME1\1T MECHANISM IN AFRICA

By
Nsongurua Udombana •
"There is no prestige for a king who has no queen."

African Proverb

:fritroductory: Why Courts Matter

~gional human rights regimes complement national systems,
which sometimes suffer from "[i]nept, inefficient, underresourced, or iniquitous governments incapable of, or perhaps
even opposed to, assisting citizens' realization of their human
rights" . 1Regional systems also complement the global ·system,
which often is problematic in achieving consensus due to
multiplicity of states and the absence of homogeneity. "As far
as their proc~sses are concerned", notes Sarkin, "regional
systems for many reasons are more accessible, cheaper for
litigants, and moreeffective in the work they do than
international courts". 2 However, the national, regional and
international regimes all share a common goal in protecting the
fundamental values that human rights embody: dignity,
respect, liberty, equality, freedom, justice, non-discrimination,
1.

2.

Margaux Hall & David Weiss: "Human Rights and Remedial Equilibration:
Equilibrating Socioeconomic Rights" (2010-2011) 36 Brook J lnt'l L 453' at
454.
Jeremy Sarkin, "Evaluating the African Commission on Human and
People's [sic] Rights and the New African Court of Justice and Human
Rights with Comparative Lessons from the Council of Europe and the
Organization of American States''. (2008) 1 Inter-Am &Eur Hum Rts / 199 at
210. '
. . . ''
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etal. Protecting these values entail mutual commitment among
the global community, which explains why human rights give
rise to ergaomnesobligations, as the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) explained in Barcelona Tracton, Light and Power

· Co Ltd (Belg v Spain). 3
Ironically, state sovereignty is still the dogma of
international law. It is states that violate human rights; it is
states that elaborate international law; and it is states that
determine what mechanisms should be established to inquire
into their compliance with their legal obligations. The coercing
power of international law lies in the wi_llingness of states to
limit their sovereignties. This probably explains why voluntary
compliance by states to their human rights obligations has been
generally weak. Although there is no fool-proof mechanism of
accountability, courts remain the handmaidens of the human
rights system. International complaint procedures, in particular
regional ones, serve important functions:
First, as a result of considering such a complaint an
individual, whose rights have been violated, may have a
remedy against the wrong suffered by him, and the violation
could be stopped and/or compensation paid, etc; second,
consideration of a complaint may result not only in a remedy
for the victim of the violation, whose complaint has been
considered, but also in changes to internal legislation and
practice; and third, an individual complaint (or more often, a
series of complaints) may serve as evidence of systematic
and/or massive violations of certain rights in a given country .4

3.

4.

Barcelona Tracton, Light and Power Co. Ltd (Belg v. Spain), 1970 ICJ 4,
para 32 (singling out obligations as including those derived "from the
principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person,
including protection from slavery and racial discrimination").
Rein Mullerson, "The Efficiency of the Individual Complaint Procedures:
The Experience of CCPR, CERD, CAT and ECHR" in ArieBloedet aleds,
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Further, experiences in other regions show that judicial
mechanisms are better suited to change states' conducts than
diplomatic or even quasi-judicial bodies. 5 The European
system is the light bearer in this regards. 6 "The European
model of economic and human rights law,'' according to
Baudenbacher, "is characterized by a high degree of
judicialization that materialized in judicial independence, broad
access to justice for individuals, dynamic interpretation, andin the case. of the Luxemburg courts- direct effect and a right
to compensation in the event of serious violation of European
7
law by national. governments;,
. . Diplomatic models of conflict
resolution have many limitations: They act behind closed doors
in order to secure confidentiality; they are under no obligation
to decide, nor are they obliged to state reasons; they are not
bound by precedent; the only players are governments; there is
a strong element of consensus (and also of political' and
economic pressure); and enforcement of diplomatic outcomes
may be a problem.8Ad hoe arbitral tribunals may be closer to
courts than diplomatic panels, but they are usually established .
for a concrete case whose facts have already occurred.
Besides, some members of a panel may be close to one party,

Monitoring Human Rights in Europe (Boston-London: Dordrecht, 1993) 25
5.

6.

7.
8.

at 27.
Sarkin, supra note 2 at 210 (noting that regional courts "arc more likely to
achieve greater enforceability of their decisions partly because of the
political will, at least in some regions, to do so by the regional system
itselr').
M. Janis, R. Kay &A. Bradley: European Human Rights Law (New. York:
Oxford Univ . Press, 1995) at 3 (arguing that the European system is the
"most successful system of international law for the protection of human ·
rights").
Carl Baudenbacher, "Judicialization: Can the European Model Be Exported
to Other Parts of the World" (2003-2004) 39 Texas Int 'l LJ 381 .at 397.
Ibid at 282.
/
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which may compromise its transparency. 9 Finally, quasijudicial bodies, like the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights [African Conunission], use procedures that do
not meet the higher legal thresholds of a court.
One plausible reason for courts' unique authorities could be
that they posses certain distinctive and even exclusive
attributes that are not conferred on diplomatic and other ad hoe
models of conflict resolution. Courts are uniquely empowered
to determine legal rights and offer remedies, perhaps because
of their relative insulation from political pressures or their
~nhanced ability_ to discern legal principles .10 The declaratory,
de~erminative, and adjudicatory functions may not be the
exclusive characteristics of judicial power, but the power to
pronrn,mce authoritatively and conclusively on what the law is,
to determine the legal rights and liabilities of contestants as
they e?<"-ist, and to impose a binding and enforceable obligation
are distinctively and exclusively judicial functions. 11
, International law generally is often criticised as being weak
by not offering effective enforcement mechanisms. A fortiori,
~<:: · African regional human rights system has often been
criticised for its weakness and ineffectiveness particularly as it
lacks an ~stitution capable of giving enforceable decisions ..
Assuming the validity of these criticisms, then states should
strive to increase the strength, credibility and 'compliance pull'

9.
Ibid.
10. Daryl Levinson, "Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration" (1999)99
Colum L Rev 857 at 861. Catherine Turnert: "Human Rights and the Empire
of (International) Law" (2011) 29 Law & Ineq 313 at 325 (arguing that the
advantage of legal form is viewed in terms of impartiality and procedural
regularity that law brings to bear on difficult situations).
11. B. 0. Nwabueze: .ludicialism in Commonwealth Africa (London: C. Hurst &
Co, 1977) at 10- 13.
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of their agreements .12 yet, as the omission of a court from the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 13 shows, states
routinely fail to draft treaties that maximise the credibility of
their promises. The omission of a court from Africa's regional
human rights milieu has weakened the force and credibility of
states' commitments to human rights protection in Africa. It
has stymied the growth of human rights, diminished
compliance of states to their treaty obligations, and robbed
Africa of robust human rights jurisprudence. As presently
con~tituted, the African Commission is not the, not. even a,
firewall against human rights abuses.
One argument for the non-inclusion of a court in the
African human rights system was a bland appeal to African
tradition, which promotes amicable and conciliatory methods
for settling disputes as opposed to the adversarial methods of
·the West. 14 Those who hold this view point to such peaceful
mechanisms as the Commission on Mediation Conciliation and
Arbitration, established by the erstwhile Organization of
.African Unity (OAU)in 1964, and the Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management and Resolution of 1993 - moribund
institutions that are now replaced by the African Union's (AU)
Peace and Security Council (PSC). The African Charter itself
encourages such a method of settlement, albeit in relation to
inter-state communications.15 However, this appeal to
12. Andrew Guzman: "The Design of International Agreements" (2005) 16 Eur
J Im'l L 579 at 580-581 (exploring the challenging dynamic that drafters
face in managing acceptance and enforceability of international treaties).
13. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted 27 June· ·1981,
entry into force 21 Oct. 1986, Doc OAU/CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev5 (1982) 21

ILM 59 [African Charter] .
14. PM Munya: "The International Court of Justice and Peaceful Settlement of
African Disputes: Problems, Challenges and Prospects" (2002). I East Afr J
Inr'l & Comp L 1 4-5.
15. African Charter, supra note 13 at arts 47 and 48.
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'tradition ' has never been convincing, considering that the
post-colonial African states have embraced adversarial justice
systems and the judicial and quasi-proceeding of UN
institutions, including the ICJ. 16 As Kindiki rightly argues, " if
it is accepted that it is (or was) culturally detestable for
Africans to use the judicial system, then, African states should
have immediately after independence dismantled the elaborate
judicial structures bequeathed to them by the colonial masters,
to replace them with consensual systems. " 17
A more plausible reason for the non-inclusion of a court in
the African Charter was sovereign pride. A~ican States, at the
time, were not willing to submit their sovereignty to a
supranational judicial body with powers to make binding
orders against them. 18 These states failed to recognize that the
human rights movement had extended the boundaries of
normativity in international legal discourse. 19 They were
16. E Diarra, " De l'Europe a l' Afrique: Le ModeleEurop4enne est-il
Exportable?" in P T avernier, ed, Quele Europe pour Les Droits de
l'Homme(Brusscls: Bruylant, 1996) 407 at 437-438.
17. KithureKindiki, "The Proposed Integration of the African Court of Justice
and the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights: Legal Difficulties and
Merits" (2007) 15 Afr J lnt 'l & Comp L 138 at 139 (noting the "(s]cientific,
empirical evidence [that] exists to show that informal mechanisms of dispute
resolution based on negotiation and consensus co-existed with indigenous
courts administering traditional justice in pre-colonial African societies");
Taslim Elias, Nature of African Customary law (3rded, Manchester Univ
Press, 1972) (a seminal work that attempts to negate a number of
patronizing misconceptions concerning African law); EA Keay & SS
Richardson, eds, Tile Native and Custommy Courts of Nigeria (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 1966).
18. ·Raymond Sock, "The Case for an African Court of Human and People's
Rights: From a Concept to a Draft Protocol over 33 Years", Afr Topics,
Mar-Apr 1994 at 9 (observing that the group of experts that met in Darkar,
Senegal, under the Chair of Justice Keba Mbaye , was given a set of
overriding principles, one of which was that they should not exceed what
African states may be willing to accept).
19. Henry Steiner, " Human Rights: The Deepening Footprint" (2007) 20 Harv
Hum Rts J 7 at 12 ("[T]he stunning achievement of the movement since its

Eyi11g tile Promised Land: Tile Wearisome Quest for a11
Effective Regional Human Rights Ellforcemell/ Mechanism in Africa

185

steeped in the Westphalian - state-centric - . tradition20and
tended to regard international concern for their human rights
records as a pretext for undermining their cherished
sovereignty. 21This fear of supranational bodies meant that
implementation of the African Charter's provisions remains
essentially a matter of domestic jurisdiction; and a few willing
states have transformed the Charter into domestic law. Even
presently, there is still a general reluctance by African states to
sufficiently empower their regional and sub-regional judicial
and quasi-judicial mechanisms. ,In the human rights field,
states seem comfortable with a non-judicial Commission or
Committee that make endless recommendations those
governments ignore with ignominy. 22 In sum, the absence of a
legitimate and robust judicial institution for human rights
accountability has resulted in a culture of impunity in Africa.
To deflate these criticisms, African states started adopting
specific protocols to establish some specialised regional courts,

inception, but particularly of the last decades[,] has been the deep
institutionalization of a new discourse for much of the world").
20. The erstwhile Organization of African Unity (OAU) placed strong emphasis
on the reserve domain doctrine, which contributed to the Member States'
reluctance to take human rights seriously and their persistent unwillingness
to criticize one another, even in the face of flagrant human rights abuses;
UO Umozurike: "The Domestic Jurisdiction Clause in the OA U Charter"
(1979) 78 AfrA!f 197 at 202 (noting, "with regard to breaches of human
rights, even of a grave nature such as genocide, the OAU has been bogged
down by the domestic jurisdiction clause").
21. G Naldi, "Futur~ Trends of Human Rights in Africa" in Michael Evans &
Rachel Murray eds: The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights:
T71e System in Practice, 1986-2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press,
2002) l at 2-5.
22. George Wachira _& Abiola Ayinda: "Twenty Years of Elusive Enforcement
of the Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights: A Possible.Remedy" (2006) 6(2) Afr Hum Rts LI 465.
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first in 1998,23 then in 2003, 24 and finally(?) in 2008. The
Human Rights Protocol is specific to human rights; 25the ACJ
Protocol is generic in its mandate. 26 Some AU Member States
are parties to one or more of these protocols; others are not.
For example, not all states parties to the 1998 Protocol are
parties to the 2003 Protocol · or , for that matter, the 2008
Protocol. It will be interesting to see how the future court will
resolve conflicting issues arising from these multiple treaties.
What is obvious is that, in terms of effective regional human
rights enforcement mechanism in Africa, Africa's continental
organisations have trea.ted Africans to a drama that, so far, is
playing out in three acts.
This paper traces these wearisome trajectories and
questions if Africans are doomed to wait in perpetuity for a
virile court to interpret and enforce the African Charter and
other relevant human rights treaties? Parts two to four spotlight
and analyse the contexts and contents of the various treaties
aimed at effective regional judicial mechanism for human
rights accountability in Africa. The final part and the

23 . Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights Establishing
an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 9, 1998, OAU Doc
OA U/LEG/EXP/ AFCHPR/ PROT(III) [H11111a11 Rights Protocolj. The
African Charter permits its States Parties to adopt special protocols or
agreements to supplement its provisions, if necessary. African Charter,
supra note 13 at art 66.
24. Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union, adopted July 11, 2003
(entry into force Feb 11, 2009) [ACJ Protocol]; K Magliveras & G Naldi,
"The African Cour t of Justice " (2006) 66 Heidelberg J /nt'L L 187.
25. The Human Rights Protocol envisages its Court to complement the
protective mandate of the African Commission. Human Rights Protocol,
supra note 23at art 2. The Protocol, thus, anticipates cooperation and
consultation between the two human rights bodies.
26. The jurisdiction of the ACJ covers, imer alia, over all cases relating to
interpretation or application of the Act and all other treaties adopted within
the framework of the AU;ACJ Protocol, supra note 24 at art 26.
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conclusion reflect on the challenges still facing the African
human rights system and offer a few recommendations.

Towards a Unified Regional Court
The consensus during the drafting of the ACJ Protocol was
that that the African Human Rights Court "shall remain a
separate and distinct institution from the Court of Justice of the
African Union" .27However, several legal and practical
questions arising from the proposed dual courts remained
unanswere~, questions relating to 'why', 'what', 'how.' ,
'when', and ' where': Why does Africa need two continental
courts; or is it a case of blindly following . the European
example? What facilities exist to support two regional courts,
given the inadequate funding of existing continental
institutions? When will the courts become operational and
where will their seats be located? How -will these courts
manage possible jurisdictional conflicts, given that the ACJ
Protocol mandates the ACJ to interpret all continental ~eaties,
n:ot excluding human rights treaties? As a commentator then
reasoned:
International law should develop uniformly in
the African continent and throughout the
international legal community. For Africa,
having two courts is likely to create more
confusion than benefits. The proposed two
courts will probably be given both contentious ·
and advisory jurisd°ictions to interpret various
legal instruments including .. human rights
treaties; thus, there is a real danger that the two
27. Decision on the Draft Protocol of the Court of Justice, AU Doc. EX/CL/59
(III), para 2.
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bodies might give . conflicting interpretations
before them and thus create disparate legal
norms. 28
·Apparently unable to answer , the many questions arising
from the decision to set up dual supranational courts, the AU
Assembly, at its 3rd Ordinary Session held in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, in July 2004, reversed its previous decision and
accepted a proposal that "the African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights and the Court of Justice should be integrated
into one Court. " 29

Adoption of the Merger Protocol and Its Statute
The idea to merge the two courts- then as a budget control
measure-was muted during the negotiation of the draft ACJ
Protocol. 30 However, states which feared that the exercise
would relegate human· rights prioritization within the Court
opposed the idea.310basanjo, then Nigeria's President and
Chairperson of the ·AU Assembly Chairperson, reasoned that
there was:
the danger of proliferation of organs of the
organization and the danger of not having
28.

Nsongurua Udombana, " An African Human Rights Court and an African
Union Court: A Needful Duality or a Needless Duplication?" (2003) 28(3)
Brook J Im'l l8, 1l at 859 [Udomba11a, "A Needful Duality? '1.
29. Assembly/AU/Dec.45(Ill) (July 2004), para 4.
30. Summary of Procedures of the First Mee ting of Experts/Judges and.the PRC
on the· Draft Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union, 22-25
Apr 2003, Expt.Judg/Draft/Prot/ACJ/Rpt.(I). C.f Ministerial Conference
on the Draft Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union, AU Doc
Min/Draft/Prot/ACJ/Rpt.(1) (June 2003).
31. Summary of Proceedings of the Second Meeting of Experts/Judges and PRC
on the Draft Protocol of the African Court of Justice of the African Union,
AU Doc Expt.Judg/Draft/Prot/ACJ/Rpt.(II) (June 2003), para 20.
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enough funds to do what we should do and just
proliferating organs .... Why shouldn't the Court
of Justice also take along with it the Court on
Human and Peoples' Rights so that we have a
Court of Justice with a division, if you like for
border issues, a division for human rights issues,
a division fo r cross border criminal issues or
whatever. . .. I will suggest in that case that the
Decision on the Operationalisation of the African
Court on Human and Peoples ' Rights should be
removed for now. Alright? That is done. 32
It looks like Obasanjo's military and, hence, authoritarian
background played out at the Summit, as he did not even allow
his peers to debate his proposal before concluding: "Alright?
That is done". Nonetheless, his reasoning echoed a similar
recommendation made by a commentator on the eve of
adoption of ACJ Protocol in 2003, 33 though his views were not
supported by other commentators who argued that:
A unified pan-African Court, which is
purportedly proficient in all areas of law, is
32. Report on the Decision of the Assembly of the Union to Merge the African
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and the Court of Justice of the African
Union, AU Doc EX.CL/162(VI), para 3.
33. Udombana, "A Needful Duality ?" supra note 28 at 864-865 ("A realistic
approach is for the AU to establish and strengthen one judicial institution,
which may be, but not necessarily. the African Human Rights Court ... There
is an alternative approach ... The AU should establish the AU Courr, not as
an arm of the AU but as an autonomous institution capable of addressing the
myriad of problems confronting the continent. The AU Court could have
different chambers ... Thus, one chamber could be seized with matters of
international economic law including economic integration, another with
human rights issues, and still others with environment or international
criminal law including terrorism, etc").
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perhaps not the best forum to handle such
specialized matters with grave implications on
the rights and dignity of individuals and groups,
on the one hand, and the functionalist and
technocratic process of economic integration, on
the other. Only a specialized human rights court
is likely to be more credible to the victims o.f
human rights violations since it will not only
have the capacity but will also be seen to have
the capacity to adjudicate human rights matters
effectively. 34
The July 2004 AU Assembly decision to merge the African
Human Rights Court with the proposed ACJ Court35set in
motion the drafting process for a merger protocol. Meanwhile,
the AU Commission recommended that the jurisdiction of the
two courts should be retained, but that it was possible for one
court to administer the two protocols through special
chambers. It further recommended that the necessary
amendments to both protocols be effected through the adoption
of a new protocol by the AU Assembly. 36 However, there was
still the legal problem of how to merge a protocol that had
already entered into force with one that was still floating, at
best. A meeting of government legal experts, which met in
Addis Ababa in March and April of 2005, acknowledged the
complexities involved in creating an integrated judicial system.
34. Frans Viljoen & EvaristBaimu: "Courts for Africa: Considering the
Coexistence of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and the
African Court of Justice" (2004)22 Neth Q Hum Rts 241 at 255.
35. Assembly Decision on the Seats of the Organs of the African Union, AU
Doc Assembly/AU/Dec.45 (III) Revl (July 2004).
36. Coalition for an Effective African Court, About the African Court, online,
Coalition for an Effective African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights

< l1ttp:!lwww. africa11co1111coalitio11. orgleditorinl.asp ?page_id= 16>.

·
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It recommended that the operationalization of the African
Human Rights Court should continue; that the ratification of
the ACJ Protocol should also continue until it comes into
force; and that only then should the process to integrate the
two courts resume. 37 The AU Executive Council approved this
recommendation at its Abuja Summit in January 2005. 38
At its July 2005 Sununit in Libya, the AU Assembly
decided to separate the question of establishing the Human
Rights Court from the question of its merger. with the ACJ. It
approved the. continuing operationalization of the Human .
Rights Court pending further reflections by AU legal experts in consultation with states - on consequences of the merger.
The Assembly mandated the AU Chairperson to work out
modalities to implement the Decision. 39 Working on
preliminary drafts prepared by Algerian Foreign minister,
Mohammed Bedjaoui (former President of the ICJ)), the
Working Group produced a "Draft Protocol on the Integration
of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and the
Court of Justice of the AU." The Executive Council received
· the Draft Protocol in January 2006 and asked for comments
from AU Member States. 40
The Draft Protocol, having received inputs from Member
States, was submitted to a joint meeting of the Permanent
Representatives Committee (PRC) and legal experts from
Member States held in Addis Ababa in May 2006. The issues
37. Ibid.
38. Executive Council De'cision on the Merger of lhe African Court and lhe
Courl of Justice of lhe African Union, AU Doc EX.CL/Dec.165 (VI) (Jan
2005).
39. AU Doc Assembly/AU/Dec.83(V) (July 2005).
40. Executive Council Decision on lhe Merger of the African Court and the
Court of Justice of the African Union, AU Doc EX.CL/Dec.237 (VIII) (Jan
2006).
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that dominated that meeting were, the composition of the
Merged Court in relation to the number and quorum of judges;
the geographical representation of judges on the Court;
whether the AU Assembly would have the power to increase
the number of judges once the Statute establishing the Court
entered into force; whether the Assembly would confer special
jurisdiction on the Court on matters other than those provided
for in its Statute; and the content of the Court's rules of
procedure. 41 The meeting, nevertheless, prepared the final
Draft Protocol, 42 which it presented to the Executive Cou ncil;
and. the Council referred the Draft to the Ministers . of Justice
and Attorneys-General from Member States, "for finalization
and submission of a report at the next Ordinary Session of the
Executive Council, in January 2007 . " 43 It was in April 2008
that the African Justice Ministers considered and approved the
draft, which was subsequently submitted to the Executive
·council for approval at its 13'h Ordinary Session. At its 11'h
Summit in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, in July 2008, the AU
Assembly adopted the Merger Protocol. 44
In adopting the Protocol, African leaders recalled "their
commitment to take all necessary measures to strengthen their
41. Chaloka Beyani: "Recent Developments in the African Human Rights
System 2004-2006" (2007) 7 Hum Rts L Rev 582 at 585 [Beyanil] (noting:
"With consensus seen as the best way of reaching decisions, the Draft
Protocol offered the benefit of friendly compromises on some of these
issues").
42. Draft Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human
Rights, AU Doc EX.CU211 (VIll) Rev.l, Annex II (May 2006) [Draft

Protocol].
43. Report on the Draft Single Legal Instrument on the Merger of the Afri"can
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and the Court of Justice of the African
Union, AU Doc EX.CUDec.283(IX).
44. Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights,
adopted July 2008 (not yet in force), AU Doc Assembly/AU/13{Xl) (2008)
[Merger Protocol]. The Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human
Rights is annexed to the Merger Protocol [Merger Statute].
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common institutions and to endow them with the necessary
powers and resources to carry out their missions effectively. " 45
On the day of its adoption, the Assembly called "on Member
States to sign and ratify the Protocol .. . as expeditiously as
possible so as to enable the Protocol to enter into force and
ensure the speedy operationalization of the merged Court". 46
The Protocol will enter into force 30 days after the deposit of
ratification instruments by fifteen States Parties. 47 The first
problem that readily reveals itself is that some States which are
parties to the Human Rights Protocol, b~t which, for whatever
reason, do not wish to ratify the Merger Protocol, shall not
have standing before the new Court. As will be shown shortly,
personal standing is reserved, inter alia, to States Parties to the
Merger Protocol, not the earlier ones.
Explaining the Protocol's Intent
The Merger Protocol situates the new Court within the
extended goals of the AU and the African Charter. 48 The Court
is conceived to "supplement the mandate and efforts of other
continental treaty bodies as well as national institutions in
protecting human rights, " 49 including the African Commission
and the African Committee. 50 The Merger Protocol also recalls
the Women's Protocol, 51 which implementation is presently
vested in the African Commission and the Human Rights
Court. The Protocol merges the African Human Rights Court
45. Merger Protocol, supra note 44 at preamble.
46. Decision on the Single Legal Instrument on the Merger of the African Court
on Human and Peoples' Rights and the African Court of Justice, AU Doc
Assembly/AU/13(XI) (July 2008), at para 3.
47. Merger Protocol, supra note 44at art 9(1).
48. Ibid at preamble at paras 1 and 2.
49. lbidatpara 10.
50. Ibid atpara 5.
51. Ibid at preamble para 8.
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and the ACJ Court "into a single Court" known as "The
Afriqm Court of Justice and Human Rights" ("Merged
Court"). 52 The Encarta Dictionary defines the word 'merge'
as, "to combine or unite with something to form a single
entity" , or "to blend, or make two or more things blend,
gradually". In corporate law, a merger is the consolidation of
two or more corporations into one under the same governing
organization. Thus, the intent of the Merger Protocol is a
complete fusion of the institutions and management of the two
courts into one, with a pool of judges chosen in accordance
with the provisions of the P~otocol and its annexed Statute.
Expectedly, the Protocol contains transitional provisions
relating to the Human Rights Protocol, but there are no
transitional provisions for the ACJ Protocol, which has now
entered into force. This omission was preventable; the drafters
of the Merger Protocol should have foreseen the entry into
force of the ACJ Protocol, even if not the operationalization of
the Court. Meanwhile, the terms of office of judges of the
Human · Rights Court shall end after election of judges of the
Merged Court, provided that the former judges shall remain in
office until the new judges are sworn in. 53 This means that, de
Jure, they cease to be judges after the election of the new
judges, but de facto, they will continue to handle any pending
human rights cases until the elected judges of the Merged
Court are sworn in, which could take an interval of some
months. This means that a smooth transition of judges of the
present Human Rights Court to the merged is not guaranteed
as a matter of course, 54 but it is hoped that some of them will
be re-elected into the Merged Court to ensure a smooth
transition.
52. Ibid at art 2.
53. Ibid at art 4.
54. Beyani, supra note 41 at 585.
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There is also a transitional provision relating to the
Registrar of the Human Rights Court, who shall remain in
office until the appointment of a Registrar for the Merged
Court. 55 The Merger Protocol also provides for the provisional
validity of the 1998 Protocol, which shall remain in force for a
transitional period not exceeding one (1) year or any other
period determined by the Assembly, after entry into fo rce of
the Merger Protocol. This period is to enable the Human
. Rights Court to take the necessary measures for the transfer of
its prerogatives, assets, rights and obligations to the Merged
Court. 56 Meanwhile, the States Parties have settled in advance
the seat of the Merged Court, which "shall be same as the Seat
of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights". 57 The
African Human Rights Court is presently seated in Arusha, 58 in
a temporary building donated by the Government of Tanzania.
The Merger Protocol provides that pending cases before the
African Human Rights Court that are not concluded before the
en~ry into force of the new Protocol "shall be transferred to the
Human Rights Section" of the Merged Court. 59 What does the
phrase "shall be transferred" mean? Will such cases begin de
novo before the new judges - as is often the case in, say, most
common law jurisdictions - or will the case simply continue
from where it stopped? What happens where a transferred case
is against a country that made the Article 34(6) Declaration
under the 1998 Protocol accepting the jurisdiction of the
· 55.
56.
57.
58.

Merger Prorocol, supra note 44 at art 6.
Ibid at art 7.
Merger Sratute, supra note 44atart 25(1).

Arusha, Tanzania, is viewed as The Hague of Africa, because it presently
hosts three international judicial bodies: the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR), the African Human Rights Court, and the Court of
Justice of the East African Conununity (EAC) .
59. Merger Protocol, supra note 44 at art 5.
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Human Rights Court to receive cases directly from individuals
and NGOs, but that country has not made a similar declaration
under the Merger Statute? The answer probably lies in the
Merger Protocol's further qualification, to wit, "on the
understanding that such cases shall be dealt with in accordance
with" the 1998 Protocol. 60

Composition and Independence
The manner in which the Merged Court is constituted will
determine its effectiveness. The independence of the Court, for
exa~ple, will be a sine qua non to effective redress, y.rhether
on human rights and other types of legal rights. 'This segment,
therefore, closely examines the provisions of the Merger
Statute on the composition and independence of the Court, in
comparative perspective.

I. Composition
The Court consists of a General Affairs Section and a Human
Rights Section, each section constituted by eight Judges. 61 The
sixteen judges of the "Full Court" will be elected by the AU
Executive Council and appointed by the AU Assembly, 62 a
rather odd provision since the AU Assembly usually 'elect' the
principal officers of the AU organs, including, judges of the
current Human Rights Court. 63 It is even not clear what
constitutes 'appointment' as distinct from 'election;' and the
'Definitions' clause provides no guidance. Nonetheless, the
judges "shall be elected through secret ballot by a two-thirds
majority of Member States with voting rights. "64 In electing
60. Ibid.
61. Merger Statute, supra note 44 at art 16.
62. Ibid at art 7(1).
63. Human Rights Protocol, supra note 23 at art 14(1); ACJ Protocol, supra
note 24 at art (( 1)(h).
64. Merger Statute, supra note 44 at art 7(2).
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the judges, the Assembly must ensure, first, "equitable
representation of the regions and the principal legal traditions
of the Continent" 65 and , second, "equitable gender
representation. "66
The provision on regional representation was one of the
hotly debated issues during the Protocol's drafting process.
States from North Africa argued in favour of strict numerical
equality, advocating a 3-3-3-3-3 representation per region.
Most other states preferred a 4-3-3-3-3 equation, with the West
(with 16 members) and North (with five members) represented
according to the weight of their AU membership. 67 The current
composition of the ~uman Rights Court roughly follows the 43-3-3-3 "equitable representation." The provision on gender
representation is a positive response to the increasing advocacy
for mainstreaming of women in national , sub-regional, and
regional bodies. The provision is also in line with demands of
the Women's Protoc~~. 68
The judges mus~ :be nationals of State Parties ,69 "elected
from among person~·" of high moral character, who possess the
qualifications requited in their respective countries for
appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are juris-consults
of recog~zed competence and experience in international law

lbid at art 7(4).
lbid at art 7(5).
Viljoe11, supra note 34 at 459 n 231.
See Women Protocol, supra note 13at art 8(e) (urging states· "take all
appropriate measures to ensure ... that women are represented equally in the
judiciary and law enforcement organs" ibid para 8);AU Act, Constitutive
Act of the African Union, adopted Jul 11, 20 10, entry into force May 26,
200l[AU Act) at art 4(1) (promoting "gender equality"); Solemn Declaration
on Gender Equality in Africa, AU Doc Assembly/AU/Decl.12 (III) (July
2003).
69. Merger Statute, supra note 44atart 3(1).
65.
66.
67.
68.
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and/or, human rights law. "70 By this provision, all judges of
the Court need not be human rights experts (though they must
be international law experts), but it is vital that the judges that
will be appointed to the Human Rights Section of the Court
should have "recognized competence and experience" in
international human rights law and/or practice.
All judges of the Merged Court shall, except the President
and Vice-Present, perform their functions on part-time basis. 71
In making the Court part-time, States Parties failed to give
serious thoughts to the diverse legal (including human rights)
issues that should commend. themselves for judicial
determination in Africa, all things being equal. Judges of most
contemporary international judicial institutions - for example,
the JCJ, International Crin1inal Court (ICC), European Court
of Justice and European Court of Human Rights - are
constituted on a full-time basis; only the Inter-American Court
on Huriian Rights pperates on a part-time basis. Having opted
for a single regional court, the AU Assembly should have
allowed the Court to operate full-time so as to fully discharge
its mandate. Thus is also an issue of diplomacy. A part-time
judicial .institution does not project the AU glowingly before
other continental bodies.
The Merger Statute provides that each Section of the Full
Court "may, at any time, constitute one or several chambers. 72
A sectional or chambers' judgment is taken as that of the
Court; 73 indeed, the Protocol defines 'Court' to mean "the
African Court of Justice and Human Rights as well as its
sections and chambers. "74 The chamber system is not really
70.
71.
72.

Ibid atart 4.
Ibid at art 8(4).
Ibid at art 19(1). The quorum required to constitute such chambers shall be

73.
74.

determined in the Rules of Court.
Ibid at art 9(2).
Ibid at art 1 (emphasis supplied).
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new. The ICJ has something similar; its Statute allows the
Court to occasionally form one or more chambers composed of
three or more judges as the Court may determine. 75 Such
chambers are authorized to deal with particular classes of
cases, for example, laces and cases relating to transit and
communications.
The judges shall hold their offices for six years, but they
may be re-elected once. 76 The Protocol provides for scattered
election, to ensure continuity of pending cases. Consequently,
"the term of office. of eight (8) judges, four (4) from each
section, elected during the first election shall end after four (4)
years. " 77 The tenure of judges whose terms will expire after
the initial four-year period shall be determined, for each
section of the Court, "by lot drawn by the Chairperson of the
Assembly or the Executive Council, immediately after the first
election. "78

2. Independence
The Merger Statute seeks to secure the independence of the
Court in many ways. It provides, more generally, that the
independence of the judges shall be fully ensured in
accordance with international law. 79 It expects the Court to act
impartially, fairly and justly 80 and that the Court and its judges
shall not be subject lo the direction or control of any person or
body in the discharge of their judicial functions. 81 The
75. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, [ICJ St<1.tutc), at
art 26.

76. Merger Statute, supra note 44at art 8(1).
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid at art 8(2).
79. Ibid at art 12(1).
80. Ibid at art 12(2).
81. Ibid at art 12(3).
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"Solemn Declaration" includes a clause . that a judge of the
Cou.r t shall 'faithfully,' 'impartially,' .and 'conscientiously'
fear or favour,
exercise the duties of his office, "without
..
affection or ill will and that (he] will preserve the integrity of
the Court. " 82
·
·
:; : .
_''.:.:
The Statute provides, more specifical~y, that a judge shall :
not be suspended or removed from offic(;'. except where, on the
reconunendation of two-thirds majority of his/her colleagues,
he/she no longer meets the requisite condi'tions to be a judge. 83
Should such a situation occur, then the President shall
communica.te the recommendation for the suspension or
removal of the Judge to the Chairperson. of the AU Assembly
through the Chairperson of the AU Commission; ·and "[s]uch a
recommendation of the Court shall become final upon its
adoption by the Assembly. "84Under the Human Rights
Protocol, "the decision of the Court shall· be final unless it is
set aside by the Assembly at its next session. "85 It is arguable
which of the two provisions better secure the independence of
the Court.
The judges of the Court "shall enjoy, from the time of their
election and throughout their term of office, the full privileges
and immunities extended to diplomatic agents in accordance
with international law; "86 and at no time. shall they be liable
"for any act or omission committed in the discharge of their
judicial functions. "87 The Statute also lays down the conditions
for excluding a judge from participation in the settlement of a
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Ibid at art 11(1).
Ibid at art 9(2).
Ibid at arts 9(3) and (4).

Human Rights Protocol, supra note 23 at art 19(2).
Merger Statute, supra note 44 at art 15(1); !CJ Statllte, supra note 75 at art

19. ("The members of the Court, when engaged on the business of the
Court, shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities").
87. Merger Statute, supra note 44 atart 15(2).
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case, 88 all aimed at preventing the charge of bias or its
likelihood. Similarly, a Judge is not expected to engage in
other activities that are incompatible with his judicial function
or that might infringe on his independence or impartiality. 89
These important expressions of international law are aimed at
ensuring the full independence of the Court and its judges.
While these measures are necessary, they are not sufficient to
ensure institutional independence in the absence of other
measures, such as sufficient funding.
Jurisdiction
Three categories of jurisdiction are provided for under the
Merger Protocol and Statute: subject-matter, personal, and
advisory.

I. Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae
Both the jurisdictions of the Human Rights Court and ACJ
under their respective protocols are incorporated in defining
the jurisdiction rationemateriae of the Merged Court. The
. matters covered have already been highlighted in part three. In
general, they include all cases and all legal disputes submitted
to it relating, inter alia, to the interpretation and application of
the AU Act; interpretation, application or validity of other
treaties and subsidiary legal instnnnents adopted within the
framework of the AU/OAU; and the interpretation and the
application of the African Charter, the African Child Charter,
the Women Protocol, or any other legal instrument relating to
human rights and ratified by the State concerned. 90

88. Ibid at art 14.
89. Ibid at art 13(1).
90. Ibid atart 28.
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The new Court obviously has an expansive jurisdiction
compared to any previous institutional experiment in Africa. It
will interpret not only legal instruments adopted under the
auspices of the OAU/AU but also those adopted outside the
Continent but ratified by the State before it. The African Child
Charter is also specifically included among treaties within the
Court's ambit. Until now, tbe Charter had no implementing
judicial institution, other than the African Committee with
mandate limited 1argely to investigating children's . rights
violations and issuing reports and recommendations. With this
inclusion, the African Child Charter stands on the same
footing with the African Charter and Women Protocol which,
hitherto, were subject to interpretation and application by the
Human Rights Court.
The Statute carefully compartmentalizes the Court's
jurisdiction. The General Affairs Section is competent to hear
all cases submitted under Article 28 of the Statute "save those
concerning human and/or peoples' rights issues, "91 while the
Human Rights Section shall be competent to hear all cases
relating to human and/or peoples rights. 92 The Statute spells
out the procedure to be followed in contentious cases, which
depends on the subject-matter. Cases brought before the
General ·Affairs Section shall be submitted by written
application addressed to the Registrar, indicating the subject of
the dispute, the applicable law, and basis of jurisdiction. 93
However, cases brought before the Human Rights Section shall
be submitted by a written application to the Registrar,
indicating the rights alleged to have been violated, and, insofar
as it is possible, the provisions of the relevant human rights

91.
92.
93.

Ibid at art 17 (italics in the original).
Ibid.
Ibid at art 33(1).
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instrument on which it is based. 94 In all cases, the Registrar is
mandated to immediately give notice of the application to all
parties concerned and to the relevant AU organs.
The Court will draw up its "Rules of Court," "taking into
account the complementarity between the Court and other
treaty bodies of the Union. "95 It is imperative that the Rules
should be simple and capable of fostering speed without
sacrificing quality. Surprisingly, the Statute fails to provide for
amicable settlement of disputes in a Continent that prides itself
as ~aving a uniquely conciliatory traditional justice ~ystem. It
is not clear if this omission was deliberate, considering that
'amicable settlement' features prominently in previous regional
and sub-regional instruments, including the African Economic
Conununity (AEC) Treaty, 96 the African Charter, 97 the Human
Rights Protocol, 98 and the Treaty Establishing the Southern
African Development Community (SADC). 99 The SADC
Treaty, for example, provides that disputes arising from the
interpretation and applicable of the SADC Treaty should be
settled in a friendly manner. Only if amicable attempt fails
should the dispute be referred to the SADC Tribunal. 100

94. Ibid at art 34(1).
95. Ibid at art 38.
96. African Economic Community Treaty, adopted June 3, 1991, entry into
force May 11, 1994, 30ILM1241, Art 87(1) [AEC Treaty].
97. African Charter, supra note 13 at paras 47 and 48.
98. Human Rights Protocol, supra note 23 at para 9 (providing: "The Court
may try to reach an amicable settlement in a case pending before it in
accordance with the provisions of the Charter").
99. Treaty Establishing the Southern African Development Community, adopted
Aug 17, 1992 (1993) 32 ILM 116 [SADC Treaty).
100. Ibid at para 32.
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2. Jurisdiction Ratione Personae
A major criticism of the Human Rights Protocol has been that
individuals and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) do
not have an automatic standing before the Human Rights
Court. Regrettably, this provision was smuggled into the final
Draft Protocol, despite strong opposition by segments of
Africa's civil society. The only entities that will have
automatic standing before the new Court in respect of human
rights matters are State Parties to the Protocol; the African
Commission;
the
African
Committee;
African
Intergovernmental Organizations ·.accr~dited to the AU or its
orga~s; and African National Human Rights Institutions. IOI
Individuals or NGOs will be entitled to submit human rights
cases against a State Party only where such a State has made a
declaration accepting the competence of the Court to receive
cases involving the State in question. I02
The Draft Protocol proposed that a wording similar to
Article 34(6) of the Human Rights Protocol be omitted and that
a general clause should be inserted allowing states explicitly to
enter reservations that are compatible with the Protocol's
object and purpose. I03 Accepting this proposal would have
meant that "states accept direct access of the Court, unless
they 'opt out' by entering a reservation to that effect. " 104
However, the adopted Protocol requires that states 'opt in' to
accept direct individual or NGO access to the Court with
respect to human rights matters. Th~ requirement effectively .
shuts the door against many individuals and NGOs, the very
entities that drive human rights. As Odinkalu and Mbelle
argue, "African leaders know their states will not sue one
101.
102.
103.
104.

Merger Statute, supra note 44 at para 30.
Ibid at para 30(f); Merger Protocol, supra note 44 atpara 8(3).
Viljoe11, supra note 34 at 459.
Ibid.
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another for human rights violations or for electi<?n-rigging. By
denying individual victims access to the new court,
governments will close an avenue through which atrocities
might be addressed, effectively rendering the court stillborn. " 105
This requirement of a state declaration is also superfluous,
because the African Charter already provides a check against
vexatious and frivolous petitions through the admissibility
procedure~ 106 especially the requirement of exhaustion of local
remedies. 107 The local remedies rule - the rule that "a State
should be given the opportunity to redress an alleged wrong
within the fram~work of its own domestic legal system before
its international responsibility can be called into question at
[the] international level" 108 - reinforces the subsidiary and
complementary relationship of the international system to
systems of internal protection. Imposing further, onerous,
requirements in the Merger Protocol is like attempting to kill a
snake with a sledgehammer.

105. Odinkalu & Mbelle: "Africa: Continent Needs Effective Human Rights
Court" (2008), online: All Africa
http://allafrica.com/stories/20080624071a.html ?page= 2:
106. African Charter, supra note 13 at art 56. C.f Human Rights Protocol, supra
note 23 at art 6(2) ("The Court shall rule on the admissibility of cases 'takin'g
into account the provisions of article 56 of the Charter"). ;
107. African Charter, supra note 13 at art 56(5) (providing "Communications
relating to human and peoples' rights referred to in 55 received by the
Commission, shall be considered if they ... [a]re sent after exhausting local
remedies, if any, unless it is obvious that this procedure is unduly.
prolonged").
108. A.A. Cancado Trindade: The Application of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local
Remedies in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press;-'
1983)
I
at 1; and generally Nsongurua Udombana, "So Far, So Fair:/ The Local
Remedies Rule in the Jurisprudence of the African CommiJsion on Human
and Peoples' Rights" (2003) 97(1) Am J lnt'/ L l.
I
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The provision denying individuals and NGOs automatic
standing is also at variance with current international legal
norms and practice, which vests individuals with rights and
responsibilities, a shift from the 'hobbesian' conception of
sovereignty, which centred on the state, to a 'kantian' notion
of sovereignty, which centres on universal citizenship. In his
address at the closing ceremony of the seminar on "The InterAmerican System of protection of Human Rights on the Eve of
the XXIst Century", held on November 24, 1999, in San Jose,
Costa Rica, Judge Antonio Augusto Can9ado Trindadeformer President of the Inter-American Court-stated:
( \ The widest participation of the petitioners in all stages of
the procedure before the Court (locus standi) is to be secured,
as part of the process conducive to the crystallization of the
right of direct access to the Court (jus standi) by the
iµdividu.als as subjects of the International Law of Human
Rights, endowed with full procedural capacity. 109
Almost all of the major human rights ... treaties give
individuals automatic access before their judicial mechanisms,
including the European Convention, which provides: "The
Court may receive applications from any person, nongovernmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to
be the victim of a violation . . . The High Contracting Parties
undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of
this right". 110 Even sub-regional economic treaties give
individuals direct access before their courts, like the Protocol
. .. · ·.
.,
I

109. Quoted in Information· Note on the First Meeting of African Court on
Human and
Peoples'
Rights,
available at
http:l/www.africau11ion.orglroot/AU/Confere11ces/Past/2006/July/summitldoc/CADHPIBACK
GROUND- DOCUMENT ON THE- AFRICAN- COURT.doc.
110. Convention· for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
adopted Nov 4, 1950, entry into force Sept 9, 1953, ETS 5; 213 UNTS 221
at art 34.
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on the ECOWAS Court of Justice. 11t Why are African States
fearful of their own continental judicial institution? A
government that truly governs in the best interest of its people
should have no fears of an independentjudiciary. 112
3. Advisory Jurisdiction
Besides contentious matters, the Court may give advisory
opinion "on any legal question" at the request of the principal
organs of the AU .113 Unlike contentious matters, the Statute
does not indicate which section of the Court should handle
what type of 'legal question,' but there is a proviso that "A
request for an advisory opinion must not be related to a
pending application before the African Commission or the
African Conunittee of Experts. " 114 The Statute sets the
procedure for advisory opinion: a written request must be laid
before the Court, containing "an exact statement of the
question upon . which the opinion is required and shall be
accompanied by all relevant documents." 115 The Registrar shall
forthwith give notice of the request to all States or organs
entitled to ;;tppear before the Court. 116 Written and/or oral
statements are then sought and received from interesting
parties, whereupon the Court "shall deliver .. its advisory
111. Supplementary Protocol to the Protocol on the ·ECOW AS Community Court
of Justice 2005, Art 10 [ECOWAS Court Supplementary Protocol]; Henry
Onoria, "Locus Standi of. Individuals and Non-State Entities before Regional
Economic Integration Judicial Bodies in Africa" (2010) 18 Afr J lnt'l &
Comp L 143 (appraising the role that locus standt of individuals and nonState crttities has on economic integration processes in Africa) .
112. Media Rights Agendll & Others v. Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 200 (ACHPR
1998) para 81 [African Commission].
113. Merger Statute, supra note 44 ·~tart 53(1).
114. Ibid at art 53(3).
115. Ibid at art 53(2).
116. Ibid at art 54(1).
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op1mon in open court, notice having been given to the
Chairperson of the Commissiop and Member States, and other
· International Organizations directly concerned. " 117
Like the name implies, advisory opinions are not binding,
but .they often provide guidance to the advisee and to Member
States. desiring to inttoduce necessary domestic reforms or to
oppose legislation that would be in breach of existing law.
Governments usually "find it easier to give effect to advisory
opinion than to comply with a contentious decision in a case
they lost. " 118 Advisory opinions also provide guidance to
domestic courts grappling with interpre~tion and application
of especially international law related issues. ·
Remedial Authority
International (human rights) law recognizes a right to a
remedy. 119 One of the features that distinguish a judicial from a
117. /bidatart55.
118. Thomas Buergenthal: "The European and Inter-American Human Rights
Courts: Beneficial Interraction" in Paul Mahoney etal eds, Protecting
Human Rights: The European Pen.pectives (Koeln: Carl Heymannns Verlag
KG, 2000) 123 at 131.
119. Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, GA Res 217A (III), UN Doc
A/810 at 71 (1948), Art 8 [UDHR] (providing that "[e]veryone has the right
to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating
the .fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or law");
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 99 UNTS 171 (Dec 16,
1966) [ICCPR], Arts 2(3), 9(5) & 14(6) (containing three separate articles
addressing the right of access to an authority competent to afford remt:dies including the right to an effective and enforceable remedy - and the right of
anyone unlawfully arrested, detained, or convicted to have an enforceable
right to compensation);Commission on Human Rights, UN Basic Principles
and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law, Res 2005/35 (Apr 2005) (containing both
procedural and substantive dimensions to the right to reparations). The Basic
Principles and Guidelines do not create anY. new substantive international or
domestic legal obligations; they merely identify mechanisms, modalities,
procedures, and methods of implementing existing legal obligations.
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quasi-judicial body is their remedial powers. One weakness of
the African Commission has been its lack of judicial teeth to
bite where it finds clear cases of human rights violations. The
Merged Court is not so constituted; a contrario , its Statute
expressly grants it powers to offer structural remedies. It
provides that "the Court may, if it considers that there was a
violation of a human or peoples' right, order any appropriate .
measures in order to remedy the situation, including granting
fair compensation. " 12 Compensation is a form of reparation;
and the goal of reparation is. to promote justice by redressing
injury suffered. There are basically two elements involved in
reparation claims: the scope of the injury and magnitude of the
misconduct. 121 It is hoped that the Merged Court, particularly
its Human Rights Section, will bear this in mind when
ordering compensations under the Statute.
The Court may also, on its own motion or the parties'
application, indicate provisional measures if it considers that
circumstances require preserving the res. 122 Provisional or
interim measures are particularly useful in the regime of
human rights protection because_, most often, their complaint
procedures are long-drawn. A party may incur irreparable
damage, physically or to property rights, during such timeconsuming administrative and judicial procedures. Sometimes,
the authority to issue such measures are expressly provided for
in treaties establishing each tribunal (as in this case) or through
the back door of procedural rules. 123 Including provisional

°

120. Merger Statute, supra note 44 at art 45.
121. Dinah Shelton: Remedies in JntemaJional Human Rights Law (Oxford:
Oxford Univ. Press, 2006) (providing an overview of the law and practice
governing human rights remedies) .
122. Merger Statute, supra note 44 at art 35(1).
123. Nsongurua Udombana, "Interim Measures: A Comparative Study of
Selected International Judicial Institutions" (2003)43(3) Indian J Int 'l L 479.
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measures in a treaty should create a stronger legal obligation
on States Parties than if such power was subsequently defined
in Rules of Procedure.

Relationship with Other Regional Mechanisms
The African Court Protocol situates its Court within the
circumference of ex1stmg, especially human rights,
institutions. The Court is adopted to "supplement the mandate
and efforts of other continental treaty bodies as well as national
institutions in protecting human rights. " 124 The Protocol
specifically referep.ces the African Commission and the
African Committee, which is empowered to receive individual
and inter-state communications and is mandated to examine
state reports 125 and to undertake fact-finding missions. 126 There
are other treaty bodies within the AU organs that have
bearings on human rights. Among these are the AU Assembly,
Executive Council, Permanent Representative Council, PAP,
AU Commission, and PSC. As the 'Supreme Organ', the AU
Assembly performs the law-making function of setting human
rights and other standards and elaborating soft laws
(declarations, resolutions, decisions, etcetera), as well as the
executive function of monitoring implementation of policies
and decisions and ensuring compliance by Member States. 127
Other quasi-judicial bodies with specific human rights
mandate - besides the African Committee - include the
African Commission, the African Coordinating Committee of
National Human Rights Institutions, and African Peer Review
Mechanism (APRM), a voluntary self-monitoring mechanism
cr~ated under the NEP AD to promote good governance in
124. Merger Protocol, supra note 44 at preamble.
125. African Child Charter, supra note 13 arts 43 and 44.
126. Ibid at para 45(1). This mandate mirrors that of the African Commission, as
authorized by Art 46 of the African Cllarter, supra note 13
127. AU Act, supra note 68 at art 9.
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Africa. The Merger Protocol provides that the attainment of
the objectives in the principal regional human rights treaties
requires the establishment of a judicial organ to supplement
and strengthen the mission of these quasi-judicial implementing
bodies. 128 Certainly, the proliferation of these mechanisms,
some with their own human rights mandate, makes
coordination an imperative. The greatest challenge will be how
to construct a united response to human rights from this
plethora of institutions. In 2006, .the Executive Council of the
AU stressed
"the need for closer collaboration between various
.
.
policy organs with competence in human rights as well as with
national human rights bodies" . 129 The future Court could play
a significant role in accomplishing that collaboration.
An Endless Wilderness Journey?

October 2011 marked the thirtieth anniversary of the. adoption
of the African Charter. The year 2011 also marks the tenth
a1miversary of the entry into force of the AU Act, in which
Member States promised, inter alia, "to take all necessary
measures to· strengthen our common institutions and provide
them with the necessary powers and resources to enable them
discharge their respective mandates effectively". 130 Given that
most of the organs envisaged under the AU Act have been
established, it is legitj.mate to ask why the constitution of a
judicial organ is being unreasonably delayed. 131 Is this delay
128. Merger Protocol, supra note 44 at preamble.
129. AU Doc Ex.CUDec.306 (IX) (June 2006).
130. AU Act, su11ra note 68 at preamble; Merger Protocol, supra note 44 at
preamble.
131. The following are the Principal Organs of the AU: Assembly of the Union,
Executive Council, Pan-African Parliament, Court of Justice, Commission,
Permanent Representatives Committee, Specialised Technical Committee,
Economic, Social and Cultural Council, Peace and Security Council, and
·
Financial Institutions. AU Act, supra note 68at art 5.
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caused by lack of will or means (or both)? Already, efforts are
on to further amend the Merger Protocol to fit the yet-to-beestablished Court with criminal jurisdiction over international
crimes "committed on African soil". 132 When will this
Wilderness Journey end? Is it even a journey with a goal and
an object, like Jason going to find the Golden Fleece?
· This final Part reflects on Africa's journey to realise human
rights, democracy' rule of law and sustainable development as
well as the road not yet taken.
Acknowledging Some Milestones
.
As previously indicated, Africa has witnessed the proliferation
of various supranational institutions in the last decade, some
h~ving bearings on human rights. There are also sub-regional
judicial courts that interpret and enforce human rights
instruments in addition to treaty laws bn integration. The
foremost sub-regional judicial institutions include the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
Court of Justice, the East African Commu11ity (BAC);Court of
Justice, and the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) Tribunal. In principle, each of these courts is
expected to contribute towards strengthening the rule of law,
developing international economic law and protecting human
rights.
132. Decision on the Implementation of the Assembly Decision on the
· International
Criminal
Court
Doc.EX.CL/670(XIX),
AU
Doc
Assembly/ AU/ Dec.366(XVII) (July 201 1), para 8 (Decision on ICC] (asking
"the [AU] Commission in collaboration with the Permanent Representatives'
·committee to reflect on how best Africa's interests can be fully defended
and protected in the international judicial system, aµd to actively pursue the
implementation of the Assembly's Decisions on the African Court of Justice
and Human and Peoples' ·Rights being empowered to try serious
international crimes committed on African soil "). See Nsongurua
Udombana: "The ICC, African Unioh, and Politics of International Criminal
Justice" (forthcoming, on file with author).
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In about a decade of its existence, the AU has built an
impressive architecture for the protection of human rights and
peoples' rights and for the promotion of rule of law,
democracy and good governance, and sustainable development
in Africa. It has also adopted more than a dozen treaties and
unveiled more than a dozen institutions touching on policyformulation, decision-making, implementation, enforcement
and/or support for democracy, good governance, rule of law,
human rights, peace and security. 133 The AU has called on its
Member States to adopt policie~ and mechanism that wµl
create
safe,
decent
and
competitive
employment
134
opportunities, in recognition of the endemic unemployment
situation in Africa. One positive outcome from these
developments is that citizens are increasingly informed of
human rights issues. On occasions, governments have been
compelled to explain on how their policies and practices
implicate on humai-1 and peoples' rights, whether in relation to
land distribution in Zimbabwe or environmental despoliation in
Nigeria's Niger Delta.
However, many problems remain, as the next segment
examines.

The Road Not Yet Taken
The decision to integrate the ACJ with the Human Rights
Court could be a. blessing in disguise. The Court, when
established, could become a sort of 'High Court' taking on
133. Report of the Study on the Implications of Expanding the Mandate of the
African Court of Justice and Human Rights to try Serious Crimes of
International Concern, AU Doc Legal/ ACJHR-PAP/5(II) (Nov 2010), at
para 2 [Report of Study].
134. Decision on the Theme: "Accelerating Youth Empowerment for Sustainable
Development
Doc.
AssemblyI AU /2(XVII) ",
AU
Doc
Assembly/AU/ Dec.363(XVII) (July 2011), at para 5(1 ) .
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broader issues of significance to all of Africa. Potentially, it
could also serve as an apex court for the various sub-regional
courts currently in existence. 135 However, this optimism 1s
tempered with scepticism for a number of reasons.

1. Same Old Challenges
Notwithstanding the wonderful initiatives to promote rule of
law, democracy and good governance, and sustainable
development in Africa, several challenges remain. There is
still the challenge of gross human rights abuses and- impunity
by the very leaders_ who have pledged to protect lives and
properties. Africans still groan under yokes of abusive
governments that 'threaten the hmocent and spare the
guilty' 136- from Zimbabwe to Libya, Uganda to Ethiopia,
Gambia to Rwanda, Liberia to Swaziland, and Algeria to
Egypt, to mention a few bastions of crudity of power. The
African Commission still receive reports of unabated human
rights violations, "including extrajudicial killings, torture and
inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment; restriction
on freedom of expression and the press, association, assembly,
arbitrary detention and arrests of journalists, human rights
defenders and political opponents". 137
Corruption compounds the problem, as ruthless rulers
entrench and enrich themselves at the price of their peoples'
dignity. There is the challenge of peace and security, as sounds
of AK47 still reverberate in half a dozen African countries 135. Olufemi Elias: "Introductory Note to the Protocol on the Statute of the
African Court of Justice and Human Rights" (2009) 48 ILM 334 at 335
[Elias, "lntrod11cto1)' Note"] (noting the significance of creating "a panAfrican court of general competence").
136. In Latin, minaturinnocentibus qui parcitnocentibus.
137. African Commission on Human and People's Rights, Activity Report 2008
EX.CL/446(XIII), at para 12 (referring to the human rights situation in
Africa as "bleak and a cause for concern").
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including the Democratic Republic (DR) of Congo, Somalia,
and Sudan . The AU Assembly observed as much during its
recent Summit in Equatorial Guinea: "Africa continues to face
serious challenges in the area of peace and security, despite the
significant progress made in conflict resolution and peace
building." 138 Concomitant with conflicts is the challenge of
political instability, as coups and attempted coups still threaten
constitutional democracy and governance in Africa. Several
coups have occurred in Africa since the AU Act, which
prohibits unconstitutional changes of goverrunents, 139 entered
into force. 140
·
In each case, the AU was unwilling to recognize the
government that came to power through coup, as enjoined by
the AU Act, 141 but some of the regimes had popular and
political support within the state. 142 It would appear that some
of the political crises and conflicts in Africa are triggered by
years of brutal dictatorships and by the current deep global
economic recession.

138. Decision on the Report of the Peace and Security Council on Its Activities
and the State of Peace and Security in Africa Doc. Assembly/AU/4(XVTI),
AU Doc Assembly/AU/Dcc.369(XVII) (July 2011), para 3.
139. See AV Act, supra note 68 at art 4(p) (condenming and rejecting
"unconstitutional changes of governments").
140. These include Togo (2005), Mauritania (2005 and 2008), Guinea (2008),
Madagascar (2009), and Niger (2010).
141. !bid at para 30 ("Governments which shall come to power through
unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of
the Union"). The AU has developed a policy of strongly opposing
unconstitutional regime change. Sec Thomas Bassett & Scott Straus,
"Defending Democracy in Cote d'Ivoire Africa Takes a Stand" (2011) 90
Foreign A.ff at 130 (commending the diplomatic actions by the AU and
ECOWAS during the constitutional crisis in Cote d'Ivoire).
142. Bki Omorogbe: "A Club of Incumbents? The African Union and Coups
d'Etat" (2011)44 Vand J. Tra11s11at'l L 123 (calling on the AU to pursue a
more nuanced policy on the problem of coups in Africa).
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There is the challenge of how to positively create an
environment for sustainable economic growth and guarantee to
all persons a life of dignity, prosperity, and happiness.
Terrorism, militancy, and religious extremism continue to
strike fear on the population of many countries. In some of
Nigeria's major cities, ·the Boko Harmn 143 sect is terrorising
persons and agencies, making some officials and experts worry
that a branch of al-Qaeda has spread its influence to that
country. 144
2. Lack of Political Will to Implement and Enforce Decisions
A related challenge is th~ lack of politica~ commitment of
states to implement and enforce its decisions. For example,
only three countries - Burkina Faso, Libya, and Mali - have
so far ratified the Merger Protocol. 145 The ratification is an
average of one a year; at this speed, it probably will take
fifteen years to secure the needed fifteen ratifications before
the operationalization of the Court. It is not clear why the
Merger Protocol did not provide for implied ratification in
respect of states that have already ratified the two earlier
Protocols. The Draft Protocol provided that, for such states,
the signing of the Protocol "shall constitute consent to be
143. Meaning, "Western Education is evil".
144. Karen Leigh: "Nigeria's Boko Haram: Al-Qaeda's New Friend in Africa?"
Time World, Aug 31, 2011, available al
http://www. time. co111/ti111e/worldlarticle/O, 8599, 2091137, 00.html
("Until
recently, the group Doko Haram has conducted attacks on Nigerian
government targets in what most terrorism experts considered an indigenous
campaign to further the organization's aim of installing Islamic law in West
Africa's most volatile country. Friday's attack [on U.N. building in Abuja)
· now has officials and experts worrying that a branch of al-Qaeda has spread
its influence to Nigeria").
145. List of Countries which have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol on
the Statute of the African Court of Justice And Human Rights, as al Jan 27,
2011, online: African Union

< http://www.au. i111/e11/sites/default/files/9999Protocol_o11_Stawte_of_tlte_A
frican_ Court_of_Justice_and_HR.pdf>.

Eyi11g the Promised Land: Til e Wearisome Quest for an
Effective Regional Hu111a11 Rights En[orcemem Mechanism in Africa

217

bound", 146unless an intention to the contrary is expressed. This
vital provision was intended to ensure a timely entry into force
of the Merger Protocol, but it was regrettably omitted in the
final document.
This half-hearted attitude is also shown in the number of
states that have so far ratified the Human Rights Protocol - 26
states, 147 just about half of the present 53 Member States of the
AU. Of this number, only Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mali,
Tanzania, and Ghana, have made the Article 34(6) Declaration
accepting the jurisdiction of the Court to receive cases directly
from individuals and NGOs. 148 · The delay in ratifying the
Protocol "is an impediment and does not enable the Court to
discharge its duties smoothly and attain its goals as the judicial
body responsible for the protection and enhancement of human
rights" . 149 Similarly, the failure of many of the ratifying states
to make the Article 34(6) Declaration "may have a negative
impact on access by African States and citizens to the
Court" .150 Indeed, as long as a good number of Member States
do not ratify the Protocol relating to the establishment of the
Court, or ~o not make the declaration to accept the jurisdiction
of the Court to directly receive cases instituted individuals and
non-governmental organizations, access to the Court will
146. Draft Protocol, supra note 41 at art 8(2).
147. AU List of Countries Which IIave Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the, Protocol
to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment
of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, online: African Union

< llllp :Ilwww. au. i11tle11/sites/defa11ltljiles/992acl1pr.pdf >
148. Ibid. Tanzania's Article 34(6) Declaration provides that, "such entitlement is
only to be granted to such NGOs and Individuals once all domestic legal
remedies have been exhausted and in adherence to the Constitution of the
United Republic of Tanzania" ibid. This qualification is superfluous, since
the exhaustion of local remedies is already an admissibility requirement
under the African regional human rights system.
149. Activity Report 2010, at para 9.
150. Ibid atpara 10.
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remain extremely limited and the legal system for the
protection of human and peoples' rights through the Court
would not play its role on the continent fully. 151
Five years after its establishment, the Arusha Human
Rights Court is yet to conclude a single matter on its merit,
except for a few admissibility and interlocutory decisions. At
least one judge, who was appointed to the Court for a-six-year
tenure, resigned his appointment few years thereafter,
probably due to frustration.152 Some judges who were elected
for an initial tenure of two or even four years - based on a
staggered arrangement153 - completed their tenure without
hearing a single case on its merit. On the face of it, the
resources used in capacitating those expired Judges, including
their honoraria, have been in vain. Meanwhile, the Court's
approved budget for 2010 was USD 7,939,375, made up of
USD 6,169,591 for operations, and USD 1,769 ,784 for
programmes. 154 Does the end justify this means?

3. Disobedience to Judicial Orders and Threats to SubRegional Judicial Independence
Enforcement of judicial remedies, whether domestic or
international, is contingent on the political will of states. The
recent contemptuous disobedience of the Court's order for

151. Ibid atpara 26.
152. Activity Report 2010, at para 3 ("Judge Githu Muigai (Kenya) who was
elected in July 2008 for a six-year term of office informed the President of
the Court by leuer of 3 June 2009 of his resignation").
153. Human Rights Protocol, supra ·note 23 at art 15(1) (providing: "The terms
of four judges elected at the first election shall expire at the end of two
years, and the· terms of four more judges shall expire at the end of four
years").
154. Decision on the Budget of the African Union for the 2010 Financial Year2
Assembly/AU/13(XIV), AU Doc Asscmbly/AU/Dec.287(XIV) (Jan. 2010),
para 2 [Decision 011 Budget].
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provisional measures by the Government of Libya 155 - State
Party to the African Charter - shows that states are likely to
'trample under feet' the decisions of a future unified court. In
Africa, hope dissolves into anxiety when one reflects on states'
attitude towards the African Commission. Except for limited
exceptions, goverrunents' record in implementing decisions of
the Commission is abysmal. At each yearly sunm1it of the
OAU/AU Assembly, African leaders take note of the
Commission's "Activity Report;" commends it for the work it
accomplished and urges it to pursue and intensify efforts ~ this
regard; reiterates the need for the Commission to be provided
with adequate resources to remove donor dependence and
enable it discharge its mandate effectively; and, finally,
authorize the Commission to publish its Report. 156 African
governments do everything to flatter the Commission except to
respect its recommendations; and such non-compliance
constitutes "one of the major factors of the erosion of the
Commission's credibility" . 157
Many states are working hard to undermine the
independence, sometimes the very existence, of the existing
sub-regional courts that these states created. In July 2008, the
ECOWAS Court ordered Gambia to release Chief
EbrimaManneh, a journalist who was arrested in 2006, and to
pay him USD 100,000. The Gambian Government not only
ignored the ruling; it brought a proposal before ECOWAS
155. Order
for
Provisional
Measures,
onJine:hup:/lwww.africa11cou/'f. orglenlimages/docw11e11ts/Orders-Files/ORDER_Application_0022013_African_Commission_v_libya.pdf (visited 14/04/2014).
156. Decision on the Report of Activities of the African Commission on Human
and Peoples' Rights, AU Doc EX.CL/446(XIID (2008) ..
157. African Commission, Non-Compliance of State Parties to Adopted
Recommendations of the African Commission: A Legal Approach, OA U
DOC/OS/50b (XXIV) (1998), para 2.
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Assembly to amend Articles 9(4) and lO(d) of the
Supplementary Protocol of the ECOWAS Court, 158 which
grants direct access to the Court in cases involving violation of
human rights, making the rule of exhaustion of domestic
remedies not applicable before the Court. 159
The SADC Tribunal has had a similar experience. In
Campbell v Zimbabwe 160 and a series of similar cases, 161 the
Tribunal held Zimbabwe in breach of the SADC Treaty by
compulsorily acquiring farms from white landowners without
offering them proper compensation and denying them a
judicial remedy. Zimbabwe refused to honour ~he judgements,
which Mugabe referred to as 'nonsense' and 'of no
consequence' . The government issued a statement to the effect
that the state was not bound by the regional court's ruling,
regarding it as being null and void of any legal effect. 162 The
SADC Summit did not push Zimbabwe to comply with its
treaty obligation. Instead, the SADC leaders set up a
committee to review the Tribunal's mandate and prohibited the
Tribunal from receiving new cases or holding hearings until
August 2012, when the review process is expected to
158. Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01105.
159. Amnesty Int'l, Public Statement: "West Africa: Proposed Amendment to
ECOWAS Court Jurisdiction is a Step Backward", AI Index: APR
05/00512009,
online:
Amnesty
International

< II rtp: //www. amnesty. org Ienllibra1y/asset IA FROS/00512009Ie11lb83jDc0758d7-447b-9b 2e-8d90c721 ad96/afr050052009e11. lltml >(calling
on
ECOWAS Member States "to reject the proposed amendment by The
Gambia, and to ensure that the jurisdiction of the Court is not eroded in any
way with regard to the adjudication of human rights cases from the subregion").
160. Campbell v. Zimbabwe, SADC (T) 212007.
L6l. Gideon Stephanus Theron & Orflers v Zimbabwe, SADC (T) 0212008;
SADC (T) 03/2008; SADC (T) 04/2008; SADC (T) 06/2008.
162. "Zimbabwe not bound by regional court ruling: Justice Minister", online:

Jurist < lltrp:l/jurisr. orglpaperchase/2010107lzimbabwe-is-nor-bou11d-bysadc-ruli11gs-j11sticemi11ister.p/lp >.
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complete. Hi3 In essence, the SADC Tribunal is being
persecuted for performing its judicial functions based on the .
evidence available before it. Gratuitous attacks of this nature
raise questions whether Africa is ready for supranational
courts. 164 The growing trend to intimidate judicial bodies dents
the economic integration agenda in Africa; and it is sad that
this is happening at a time when the AU and its Member States
are calling for "African solutions to African problems".

4. The Perennial Problem of lnsfi:tutional Underfunding
The AU is proposing a unified court at a time of considerable
institutional confusion and flux. Many new regional institutions
have come on board in the last decade, some with conflicting
mandate with earlier mechanisms. Many of these institutions
are grossly underfunded by their parent bodies, resulting in
their inability to effectively perform their statutory mandates.
Many of these ~stitutions still carry bowels to beg for money
from the European Union (EU), Canadian . International
Development Agency (CIDA), German Technical Cooperation
Agency (GTZ); Konrad Adenauer Foundation; Danish Institute
of Human Rights; McArthur Foundation , Open Society Justice
Initiative, and other Western institutions.
163. Precious Ndlovu: "Campbell v Republic of Zimbabwe: A Moment of Truth
for the SADC Tribunal" (2011) l SADC LJ 63 at 78 ("While the review of
the Tribunal's structure and function is not in itself irregular, the same
cannot be said of the effect that this decision has had on the work of the
Tribunal. The Tribunal's power to receive and hear new matters has been
withdrawn. The Summit failed to renew the terms of office of the judges
whose tenure had expired .... Consequently, the Summit's decision in intent
and effect suspended the Tribunal").
164. "ls Africa Ready for Supranational Courts?" Africa Legal Aid Newsletter
(Sept 2011), online: Africa Legal Aid

< htlp://www.africalegalaid.com/!Manager/MailingWeb/5300/XZmITRGBU
a6k/385401/1457169#>.
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The African Commission again provides a telling
illustration of institutional neglect; and this is how Viljoen
expresses the problem:
Despite repeated calls by the [AU] Assembly,
the Commission and its Secretariat remain
under-resourced, and are forced to rely on
outside funds for most of its promotional work
and for the appointment of at least a bare
minimum of legal officers. Despite making lofty
declarations a~d commitments of support to the
. . Commissi~n, especially on the occasion of the
.w. •
20-year commemoration of the adoption of the
.Charter, the AU allowed the Commission's
..staffing situation to deteriorate into an
. ·· .'. . ~nprecedented crisis. 165
: • T

,lo

t·'•

... , ,Tne approved budget for the African Commission for the
f:Q08 . ·.f~s.cal year was USD 6,003,856.86, comprising an
9.P~rational Budget of USD 4,584,390.00, and a Programme
Bu~get; of USD 1,419,466.86. 166 In 2010, that figure dropped
to USD 4,929,852 of which USD 2,968,874 was for
Operations while USD 1,960,978 was for Programmes. 167 Of
course, there is always a wide margin between approved sums
and actual releases. Meanwhile, the slim approved for the
Commission in 20 io was far less than that of the amorphous
organ called PAP, which approved budget stood at USD
14,149,250, made up of USD 9,129,736 for Operations and
USD 5,019,514 for Programmes. 168 Such huge gaps indict a

165.
166.
167.
168.

Viljoen, supra note 34 at 315.
Activity Report 2008, supra note 137at para 38.
Decision on Budget, supra note 154 at para 2.
Ibid.
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lack of prioritization of needs by the AU. An organization that
cannot, or will not, fund its vital institutions should not
complain of external interference. Actually, no judicial or
quasi-judicial institution is truly independent until it is
independent of donor funding. As Magliveras opined,
" [d]emocracy, the rule of law and the protection of human
rights are a costly business. None can be achieved on the
cheap" . 169

What to Do
Africa's past experiment with institution building have
seemingly been based on an evolutionary paradigm, where all
things evolved in a natural and inexorable process of
development from simpler to more complex and efficient
forms, following the principle of "survival of the fittest." The
thinking has been that, with minimal or no support, Africa's
institutions will take their destinies in their own hands and
eventually perfect themselves. Such jaundiced thinking
explains why many of Africa's key institutions have atrophied,
lacking strong financial and operational resources from states
that set them up. In principle, the proposal to merge the two
· continental judicial institutions is part of the implementation of
the AU Assembly's decision to rationalize its institutions,
avoid duplication of mandate, and ensure cost effectiveness
within the AU. 170 The challenge is how to bring this i long.
process to a logical end, while also ensuring effective
169. Konstantinos Magliveras, "The African Union (AU)", ASIL Reports on
Intemarional Organizations (2010), online: ASIL
< h((p ://www. asil. org!riolafricanunion_2008. htmlllfoornores >
170. Elias, "!11rroducro1y Nore", supranote 135 at 334 ("The decision [to merge
the two Courts] was based on concerns regarding the increasing number of
African Union institutions and the cost of maintaining them. The main idea
was to consolidate the limited resources available for a single court").
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enforcement of human rights guaranteed in all relevant
instruments ratified by states parties. This segment is a further
reflection on some of these issues.

1.

'Law Speaks Tlzrougli Power'

The interests that human rights embody are sufficiently strong
enough to justify the imposition of duties on states. 171 This
assumption is implicit in the adoption and ratification of human
rights treaties and in the pactasunctservanda requirement
arising therefrom, including the obligation to adopt legislative
and other measures to give effects to ~ese rights at the
domestic level. This assumption also provides justification for
complementary international mechanisms to protect human
rights. 172 An independent court that is sufficiently resourced is
a more suitable mechanism to interpret .the clusters of legal
relations and interests involved in human rights and to provide
effective remedies for their violations, based on the legal
maxim, ubi jus ibiremedium. Law speaks through power, not
dialogue. Besides:
It is against international law and the spirit of African
solidarity to put African citizens in a situation where they are
bound by the various Treaties, Protocols, Declarations and
Decisions made under the ambit of the AU and the RECs, yet
have no recourse through an independent and impartial
tribunal, when their rights, guaranteed under the said
instruments, are violated. 173
171. Joseph Raz: T71e Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) at
· 165 et seq.
172. Pavlos Eleftheriadis: Legal Rights (Oxford, Oxford Univ Press, 2008)
(offering a general account of legal rights).
173. Communique of the Inaugural Colloquium of Legal Scholars on the African
Human Rights System, convened by the Pan African Lawyers Union, in
Arusha, Tanzania (July 2011), para 9 [PALU Communique} (on file with
author).
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To reap the fruits of economic integration envisaged under
the AU Act,· African states must uphold international rule of
law. These states bear the primary responsibilities for the
establishment and proper functioning of the proposed Merged
Court. These obligations are imperative and positive, entailing
investing in infrastructure and other resources, including
personnel, paper, computers, printers, and a functional library.
The Merged Court, when established, must not be subjected to
financial ridicule, by allowing it to carry bowels and beg for
funds from the global community. It should be properly
resourced so to enable it to face the critical task of human
rights protection and allied matters. Only an empowered and
independent court can protect human rights, develop
international law , strengthen the rule of law, deepen
democracy, and deal with the many legal and other crises that
continue to plague Africa.

2.

'Etenial Vigilance is tile Price of Liberty'

The endless adoption of protocols with no visible and viable
court to check impunity is wearisome, but the civil society
must not give up. Whatever modest progress that Africa has
made in mainstreaming human rights in regional politics and
policies has been through relentless struggles by the civil
society, the main analytical paradigm in African politics. The
repressive post-colonial governments think first of national
sovereignty and the personal good of the rnling before they
consider the cornn1011 good, if at all. The civil society,
including human rights NGOs, should realise that one victory
is not, and should never be, the end of the strnggle to enthrone
accountability in Africa. They should work with governmental
and other institutional stakeholders to make the court project a
reality. Africa's governments should be reminded that they'
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have little to gain by not meeting their international human
rights commitments. This civil society pressure should run
concomitantly with human rights monitoring, advocacy, and
resource assistance.
Significantly, Africa's inter-governmental orgnisations
(IGOs) now recognise the role of civil societies in the
advancement of human rights. The Grand Bay Declaration,
adopted at the first OAU Ministerial Conference on human
rights in 1999, 174 acknowledged the positive contributions that
African NGOs have made in the promotion and protection of
human rights . 175 It recognised the importance of p·romoting an
African civil society and calls on African governmdnts to offer
their constructive assistance to these non-state actors in order
to consolidate democracy and development. 176 A year
thereafter, the AU Act was adopted, in which States Parties
promised "to build a partnership between governments and all
segments of civil society, in particular women, youth and the
private sector, in order to strengthen solidarity and cohesion
among our peoples" . 177There is, thus, a normative framework
for civil society's engagements with AU organs.
Not surprisingly, many indigenous African civil societies,
like PALU and the Coalition for an Effective African Court,
have consultative status with the AU Authority. These and
others should continue to engage the AU organs and Member
States to ensure that human rights are not lost in the morass of
endless protocols. Indeed, all Africans must become vigilantes
for human rights accountability, since eternal vigilance
remains the price of liberty.

174. Mauritius OA U Conference on Human Rights, (1999) 36(4) Africa Research
Bulletin: Political, Social, and Cultural Series 135 [Grand Bay Declaration].
· 175. Ibid at preamble.
l 76. Ibid at para 17.
177. AU Act, supra note at 68 preamble.
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Conclusion: Between the Mountain Top and the Promised
Land
Africans have wandered for years in the wilderness of
unfulfilled expectations in the enjoyment of their basic rights
and freedoms. In the last few years, leaders, who hitherto
turned their countries into a human rights graveyard, took their
citizens to the 'Mountain Top' to view the Promised Lan~
through the prisms of multiple human rights ~nstruments. The
African Charter and its supplementary .protocols offered so
much pro~ise for Africans - promise of dignity, liberty, fair
trial and rule of law, education, work and social security,
health and healthy environment, women equality and
empowerment, political participation and good governance,
peace, etcetera. However , it is no longer certain how soon
Africans will enjoy these promises, given that the journey to
human rights accountability has been a zigzag; one step
forward, two steps backward - sometimes no movement at all.
The 1998 Protocolis now almost urrrecognisable due to the
numerous alterations, re-organisations, re-arrangements, and
re-enactments pf its provisions. The Human Rights Court faces
the danger of being lost in transition. 178
The African human system has the potential to deliver on
its promise, but that will depend on States Parties' willingness
to undertake a radical restructuring of its institutional
mechanism for protection. ·w hile adopting the Merger
Protocol, African States expressed the sentiment that, the
establishment of an African Court of Justice and Human Rights
shall assist in the achievement of the goals pursued by the
African Union and that the attainment of the objectives of the
178. Dan Juma: "Lost (or Found) in Transition - The Anatomy of the New
African Court of Justice and Human Rights" (2009) 13 Max Planck YBUNL
267.
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African Charter . . . requires the establishment of a judicial
organ to supplement and strengthen the mission of the African
Corllinission ... as well as the African Committee ... 179
Agreed! In fact, th~ Court could also contribute towards
healing a continent torn apart by coups, dictatorships, strife,
wars, famine, and, above all, genocide. Such a court is
particularly relevant at a time like this when human rights are
once again under great strains in Africa, when many states are
still far from resembling a coherent polity, and when
politicians are becoming increasingly selfish and cynical.
. Whether the Court will live up to these great expectations is a
different matter entirely - optimism· is the motor that drives
hope, without which there would be despair to fulfil its own
prophecy of doom. The citizens' immediate concern is how
and when the AU and its Member States will transit from the
current Shakespearean dilemma of 'to be or not to be' and turn
hope into reality . The milk and honey is beyond this
wilderness.

179. Merger Protocol. supra note 44 al preamble.

